Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations

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Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations. / Schultz, Christian.

In: European Economic Review, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1997, p. 147-162.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Schultz, C 1997, 'Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations', European Economic Review, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 147-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00015-3

APA

Schultz, C. (1997). Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations. European Economic Review, 41(1), 147-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00015-3

Vancouver

Schultz C. Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations. European Economic Review. 1997;41(1):147-162. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00015-3

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations. In: European Economic Review. 1997 ; Vol. 41, No. 1. pp. 147-162.

Bibtex

@article{b3c06a4074c611dbbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations",
abstract = "Empirical investigations suggests that the real wage is surprisingly flat over the business cycle. This paper analyses a repeated game between a union and a firm which can contribute to explaining the flat wage. The parties cannot enter binding contracts, and revenue is fluctuating. The paper focuses on the best subgame-perfect equilibrium among those sharing the expected surplus in given fixed shares - e.g. equal shares. It is shown that (for moderate discount factors) this equilibrium has a more counter-cyclical wage, than what would be the case if the parties shared the surplus in each period in the same shares",
author = "Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL classifications: E3, E24, J30, J50",
year = "1997",
doi = "10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00015-3",
language = "English",
volume = "41",
pages = "147--162",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Wages and employment in a repeated game with revenue fluctuations

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL classifications: E3, E24, J30, J50

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - Empirical investigations suggests that the real wage is surprisingly flat over the business cycle. This paper analyses a repeated game between a union and a firm which can contribute to explaining the flat wage. The parties cannot enter binding contracts, and revenue is fluctuating. The paper focuses on the best subgame-perfect equilibrium among those sharing the expected surplus in given fixed shares - e.g. equal shares. It is shown that (for moderate discount factors) this equilibrium has a more counter-cyclical wage, than what would be the case if the parties shared the surplus in each period in the same shares

AB - Empirical investigations suggests that the real wage is surprisingly flat over the business cycle. This paper analyses a repeated game between a union and a firm which can contribute to explaining the flat wage. The parties cannot enter binding contracts, and revenue is fluctuating. The paper focuses on the best subgame-perfect equilibrium among those sharing the expected surplus in given fixed shares - e.g. equal shares. It is shown that (for moderate discount factors) this equilibrium has a more counter-cyclical wage, than what would be the case if the parties shared the surplus in each period in the same shares

U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00015-3

DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00015-3

M3 - Journal article

VL - 41

SP - 147

EP - 162

JO - European Economic Review

JF - European Economic Review

SN - 0014-2921

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 155833