Strategic Sample Selection

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Strategic Sample Selection. / Di Tillio, Alfredo; Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter Norman.

In: Econometrica, Vol. 89, No. 2, 03.2021, p. 911-953.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Di Tillio, A, Ottaviani, M & Sørensen, PN 2021, 'Strategic Sample Selection', Econometrica, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 911-953. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17288

APA

Di Tillio, A., Ottaviani, M., & Sørensen, P. N. (2021). Strategic Sample Selection. Econometrica, 89(2), 911-953. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17288

Vancouver

Di Tillio A, Ottaviani M, Sørensen PN. Strategic Sample Selection. Econometrica. 2021 Mar;89(2):911-953. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17288

Author

Di Tillio, Alfredo ; Ottaviani, Marco ; Sørensen, Peter Norman. / Strategic Sample Selection. In: Econometrica. 2021 ; Vol. 89, No. 2. pp. 911-953.

Bibtex

@article{5b495963f8f14a109568738d33472fa0,

title = "Strategic Sample Selection",

abstract = "Are the highest sample realizations selected from a larger presample more or less informative than the same amount of random data? Developing multivariate accuracy for interval dominance ordered preferences, we show that sample selection always benefits (or always harms) a decision maker if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log-supermodular (or log-submodular), as in location experiments with normal noise. We find nonpathological conditions under which the information contained in the winning bids of a symmetric auction decreases in the number of bidders. Exploiting extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information revealed when the presample size (number of bidders) goes to infinity. In a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we derive implications for the optimal design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.",

keywords = "Accuracy, auctions, comparison of experiments, design of experiments, examinee choice, information aggregation, peremptory challenge, persuasion, strategic selection, welfare",

author = "{Di Tillio}, Alfredo and Marco Ottaviani and S{\o}rensen, {Peter Norman}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 The Econometric Society",

year = "2021",

month = mar,

doi = "10.3982/ECTA17288",

language = "English",

volume = "89",

pages = "911--953",

journal = "Econometrica",

issn = "0012-9682",

publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic Sample Selection

AU - Di Tillio, Alfredo

AU - Ottaviani, Marco

AU - Sørensen, Peter Norman

PY - 2021/3

Y1 - 2021/3

N2 - Are the highest sample realizations selected from a larger presample more or less informative than the same amount of random data? Developing multivariate accuracy for interval dominance ordered preferences, we show that sample selection always benefits (or always harms) a decision maker if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log-supermodular (or log-submodular), as in location experiments with normal noise. We find nonpathological conditions under which the information contained in the winning bids of a symmetric auction decreases in the number of bidders. Exploiting extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information revealed when the presample size (number of bidders) goes to infinity. In a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we derive implications for the optimal design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.

AB - Are the highest sample realizations selected from a larger presample more or less informative than the same amount of random data? Developing multivariate accuracy for interval dominance ordered preferences, we show that sample selection always benefits (or always harms) a decision maker if the reverse hazard rate of the data distribution is log-supermodular (or log-submodular), as in location experiments with normal noise. We find nonpathological conditions under which the information contained in the winning bids of a symmetric auction decreases in the number of bidders. Exploiting extreme value theory, we quantify the limit amount of information revealed when the presample size (number of bidders) goes to infinity. In a model of equilibrium persuasion with costly information, we derive implications for the optimal design of selected experiments when selection is made by an examinee, a biased researcher, or contending sides with the peremptory challenge right to eliminate a number of jurors.

KW - Accuracy

KW - auctions

KW - comparison of experiments

KW - design of experiments

KW - examinee choice

KW - information aggregation

KW - peremptory challenge

KW - persuasion

KW - strategic selection

KW - welfare

U2 - 10.3982/ECTA17288

DO - 10.3982/ECTA17288

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85102751474

VL - 89

SP - 911

EP - 953

JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

SN - 0012-9682

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 291019411