Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: Experimental evidence

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue : Experimental evidence. / Breinbjerg, Jesper Breinbjerg; Sebald, Alexander Christopher; Østerdal, Lars Peter .

In: Review of Economic Design, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2016, p. 207–236.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Breinbjerg, JB, Sebald, AC & Østerdal, LP 2016, 'Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: Experimental evidence', Review of Economic Design, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 207–236. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4

APA

Breinbjerg, J. B., Sebald, A. C., & Østerdal, L. P. (2016). Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: Experimental evidence. Review of Economic Design, 20(3), 207–236. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4

Vancouver

Breinbjerg JB, Sebald AC, Østerdal LP. Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: Experimental evidence. Review of Economic Design. 2016;20(3):207–236. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4

Author

Breinbjerg, Jesper Breinbjerg ; Sebald, Alexander Christopher ; Østerdal, Lars Peter . / Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue : Experimental evidence. In: Review of Economic Design. 2016 ; Vol. 20, No. 3. pp. 207–236.

Bibtex

@article{b3118ff635cf4e4ab580c5410ce1c281,
title = "Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: Experimental evidence",
abstract = "We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.",
author = "Breinbjerg, {Jesper Breinbjerg} and Sebald, {Alexander Christopher} and {\O}sterdal, {Lars Peter}",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4",
language = "English",
volume = "20",
pages = "207–236",
journal = "Review of Economic Design",
issn = "1434-4742",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue

T2 - Experimental evidence

AU - Breinbjerg, Jesper Breinbjerg

AU - Sebald, Alexander Christopher

AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.

AB - We theoretically and experimentally study the differential incentive effects of three well known queue disciplines in a strategic environment in which a bottleneck facility opens and impatient players decide when to arrive. For a class of three-player games, we derive equilibrium arrivals under the first-in-first-out (FIFO), last-in-first-out (LIFO), and service-in-random-order (SIRO) queue disciplines and compare these predictions to outcomes from a laboratory experiment. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that people arrive with greater dispersion when participating under the LIFO discipline, whereas they tend to arrive immediately under FIFO and SIRO. As a consequence, shorter waiting times are obtained under LIFO as compared to FIFO and SIRO. However, while our theoretical predictions admit higher welfare under LIFO, this is not recovered experimentally as the queue disciplines provide similar welfare outcomes.

U2 - 10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4

DO - 10.1007/s10058-016-0190-4

M3 - Journal article

VL - 20

SP - 207

EP - 236

JO - Review of Economic Design

JF - Review of Economic Design

SN - 1434-4742

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 162157222