Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 95 |
Issue number | 9-10 |
Pages (from-to) | 1213–1222 |
ISSN | 0047-2727 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2011 |
ID: 36061980