Political Competition and Polarization

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Political Competition and Polarization. / Schultz, Christian.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Schultz, C 1996 'Political Competition and Polarization' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Schultz, C. (1996). Political Competition and Polarization. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Schultz C. Political Competition and Polarization. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 1996.

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Political Competition and Polarization. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.

Bibtex

@techreport{c5663e70e92b11dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Political Competition and Polarization",
abstract = "This paper considers political competition and the consequences of political polarization when parties are better informed about how the economy functions than voters are. Specifically, parties know the cost producing a public good, voters do not. An incumbent's choice of policy acts like a signal for costs before an upcoming election. It is shown that the more polarized the political parties the more distorted the incumbent's policy choice.",
author = "Christian Schultz",
year = "1996",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Political Competition and Polarization

AU - Schultz, Christian

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - This paper considers political competition and the consequences of political polarization when parties are better informed about how the economy functions than voters are. Specifically, parties know the cost producing a public good, voters do not. An incumbent's choice of policy acts like a signal for costs before an upcoming election. It is shown that the more polarized the political parties the more distorted the incumbent's policy choice.

AB - This paper considers political competition and the consequences of political polarization when parties are better informed about how the economy functions than voters are. Specifically, parties know the cost producing a public good, voters do not. An incumbent's choice of policy acts like a signal for costs before an upcoming election. It is shown that the more polarized the political parties the more distorted the incumbent's policy choice.

M3 - Working paper

BT - Political Competition and Polarization

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 2984037