Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities. / Crepaz, Michele; Hanegraaff, Marcel; Junk, Wiebke Marie.

In: Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2023, p. 530–560.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Crepaz, M, Hanegraaff, M & Junk, WM 2023, 'Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities', Comparative Political Studies, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 530–560. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221109441

APA

Crepaz, M., Hanegraaff, M., & Junk, W. M. (2023). Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities. Comparative Political Studies, 56(4), 530–560. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221109441

Vancouver

Crepaz M, Hanegraaff M, Junk WM. Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities. Comparative Political Studies. 2023;56(4):530–560. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140221109441

Author

Crepaz, Michele ; Hanegraaff, Marcel ; Junk, Wiebke Marie. / Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying? A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities. In: Comparative Political Studies. 2023 ; Vol. 56, No. 4. pp. 530–560.

Bibtex

@article{1d084d23a5204f61ac2d12b6b516beb6,
title = "Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying?: A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities",
abstract = "The first mover advantage is a critical factor for the productivity of firms that enter new markets. Surprisingly, however, the importance of timing is rarely explored in studies of interest groups and their influence on new policy agendas. In this article, we therefore develop a theory of first mover advantages in lobbying. We argue that especially more resourceful and more highly affected organizations should be able to benefit from early lobbying. Using granular survey data on the timing of lobby efforts by interest groups on Covid-19 related policies in 10 European democracies, we test this novel theory. Our results show that timing is an important predictor of lobbying influence, but that interest groups which are hardly affected by a new policy cannot benefit from early mover advantages in the same way as affected organizations. Moreover, we give evidence for differences in first mover advantages depending on organizational staff resources.Keywords",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, first mover advantage, interest groups, influence, comparative politics, organizational theory",
author = "Michele Crepaz and Marcel Hanegraaff and Junk, {Wiebke Marie}",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1177/00104140221109441",
language = "English",
volume = "56",
pages = "530–560",
journal = "Comparative Political Studies",
issn = "0010-4140",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Is There a First Mover Advantage in Lobbying?

T2 - A Comparative Analysis of How the Timing of Mobilization Affects the Influence of Interest Groups in 10 Polities

AU - Crepaz, Michele

AU - Hanegraaff, Marcel

AU - Junk, Wiebke Marie

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - The first mover advantage is a critical factor for the productivity of firms that enter new markets. Surprisingly, however, the importance of timing is rarely explored in studies of interest groups and their influence on new policy agendas. In this article, we therefore develop a theory of first mover advantages in lobbying. We argue that especially more resourceful and more highly affected organizations should be able to benefit from early lobbying. Using granular survey data on the timing of lobby efforts by interest groups on Covid-19 related policies in 10 European democracies, we test this novel theory. Our results show that timing is an important predictor of lobbying influence, but that interest groups which are hardly affected by a new policy cannot benefit from early mover advantages in the same way as affected organizations. Moreover, we give evidence for differences in first mover advantages depending on organizational staff resources.Keywords

AB - The first mover advantage is a critical factor for the productivity of firms that enter new markets. Surprisingly, however, the importance of timing is rarely explored in studies of interest groups and their influence on new policy agendas. In this article, we therefore develop a theory of first mover advantages in lobbying. We argue that especially more resourceful and more highly affected organizations should be able to benefit from early lobbying. Using granular survey data on the timing of lobby efforts by interest groups on Covid-19 related policies in 10 European democracies, we test this novel theory. Our results show that timing is an important predictor of lobbying influence, but that interest groups which are hardly affected by a new policy cannot benefit from early mover advantages in the same way as affected organizations. Moreover, we give evidence for differences in first mover advantages depending on organizational staff resources.Keywords

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - first mover advantage

KW - interest groups

KW - influence

KW - comparative politics

KW - organizational theory

U2 - 10.1177/00104140221109441

DO - 10.1177/00104140221109441

M3 - Journal article

VL - 56

SP - 530

EP - 560

JO - Comparative Political Studies

JF - Comparative Political Studies

SN - 0010-4140

IS - 4

ER -

ID: 311599271