Deadlines and Memory Limitations

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This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging checkup appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients’ behavior. Imposing deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond to deadlines even if these are not tied to explicit rewards. Several of our findings suggest that individuals’ responses to deadlines are shaped by limitations in memory and attention. Our results illustrate that deadlines can be a powerful management tool to encourage timely task completion and to increase the cost effectiveness of performance-contingent rewards.

Original languageEnglish
JournalManagement Science
Volume68
Issue number9
Pages (from-to)6733-6750
Number of pages18
ISSN0025-1909
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2022

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
This work was supported by the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and the Volkswagen Foundation (Schumpeter Fellowship “Understanding Default Effects”). The authors would like to express their gratitude to Ulf Jüptner and his team for their invaluable support in conducting the field experiments at their clinic. The authors thank Michele Belot, Keith M. Ericson, Kyle Hyndman, David Laibson, Dmitry Taubinsky, Klaus Wälde, and Joachim Winter for valuable comments and suggestions. The paper also benefited from fruitful discussions with seminar and conference participants in Bergamo, Berlin, Copenhagen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Gothenburg, Harvard, Kaiserslautern London, Kiel, Mannheim, Mainz, Marburg, Munich, Prague, Rotterdam, and San Diego. Ann-Kathrin Crede, Nicolas Kaufung, Kyle Ott, and Tom Rauber provided excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was titled “Deadlines and Cognitive Limitations.”

Funding Information:
History: Accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: This work was supported by the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and the Volkswagen Foundation (Schumpeter Fellowship “Understanding Default Effects”). Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021. 4227.

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 INFORMS.

    Research areas

  • deadlines, field experiment, limited attention, memory limitations

ID: 322466597