Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

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Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency. / Schultz, Christian.

In: Economics Letters, Vol. 123, 2014, p. 266-269.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Schultz, C 2014, 'Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency', Economics Letters, vol. 123, pp. 266-269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024

APA

Schultz, C. (2014). Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency. Economics Letters, 123, 266-269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024

Vancouver

Schultz C. Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency. Economics Letters. 2014;123:266-269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency. In: Economics Letters. 2014 ; Vol. 123. pp. 266-269.

Bibtex

@article{c806c940796a49bdaf549f5cdbb745fc,
title = "Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency",
abstract = "This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral pricediscrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are notavailable, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brandswitching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparencyreduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise,the results are the same as without long-term contracts.",
author = "Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL classification: L13, L41",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024",
language = "English",
volume = "123",
pages = "266--269",
journal = "Economics Letters",
issn = "0165-1765",
publisher = "Elsevier",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL classification: L13, L41

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral pricediscrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are notavailable, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brandswitching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparencyreduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise,the results are the same as without long-term contracts.

AB - This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral pricediscrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are notavailable, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brandswitching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparencyreduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise,the results are the same as without long-term contracts.

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024

M3 - Journal article

VL - 123

SP - 266

EP - 269

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

SN - 0165-1765

ER -

ID: 125163673