Attribution and reciprocity

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Attribution and reciprocity. / Sebald, Alexander Christopher.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 68, No. 1, 2010, p. 339-352.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Sebald, AC 2010, 'Attribution and reciprocity', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 68, no. 1, pp. 339-352. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004

APA

Sebald, A. C. (2010). Attribution and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(1), 339-352. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004

Vancouver

Sebald AC. Attribution and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior. 2010;68(1):339-352. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004

Author

Sebald, Alexander Christopher. / Attribution and reciprocity. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2010 ; Vol. 68, No. 1. pp. 339-352.

Bibtex

@article{99b83b309b8f11debc73000ea68e967b,
title = "Attribution and reciprocity",
abstract = "People infer causes and assign responsibilities for situations they find themselves in. In contradiction with classical presumptions about human behavior, it has been found that the assignment of responsibilities influences people's perceptions about the (un)kindness of others. Kindness perceptions, in turn, influence behavior. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G., 2004. A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econ. Behav. 47 (2), 268-298] formalize this empirical finding in their {\textquoteleft}theory of sequential reciprocity'. This paper extends their analysis by moves of chance. More precisely, an extended framework is presented which allows for the analysis of strategic interactions of reciprocal agents in situations in which material outcomes also depend on chance. Moves of chance influence the attribution of responsibilities, people's perceptions about the (un)kindness of others and, hence, their reciprocal behavior. Furthermore, with the help of two applications it is demonstrated how this framework can be used to explain experimental findings showing that people react very differently in outcomewise-identical situations depending on the moves of chance involved.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, psychological games, attribution theory, procedural concerns",
author = "Sebald, {Alexander Christopher}",
note = "JEL classification: D01, C70",
year = "2010",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004",
language = "English",
volume = "68",
pages = "339--352",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Attribution and reciprocity

AU - Sebald, Alexander Christopher

N1 - JEL classification: D01, C70

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - People infer causes and assign responsibilities for situations they find themselves in. In contradiction with classical presumptions about human behavior, it has been found that the assignment of responsibilities influences people's perceptions about the (un)kindness of others. Kindness perceptions, in turn, influence behavior. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G., 2004. A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econ. Behav. 47 (2), 268-298] formalize this empirical finding in their ‘theory of sequential reciprocity'. This paper extends their analysis by moves of chance. More precisely, an extended framework is presented which allows for the analysis of strategic interactions of reciprocal agents in situations in which material outcomes also depend on chance. Moves of chance influence the attribution of responsibilities, people's perceptions about the (un)kindness of others and, hence, their reciprocal behavior. Furthermore, with the help of two applications it is demonstrated how this framework can be used to explain experimental findings showing that people react very differently in outcomewise-identical situations depending on the moves of chance involved.

AB - People infer causes and assign responsibilities for situations they find themselves in. In contradiction with classical presumptions about human behavior, it has been found that the assignment of responsibilities influences people's perceptions about the (un)kindness of others. Kindness perceptions, in turn, influence behavior. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G., 2004. A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games Econ. Behav. 47 (2), 268-298] formalize this empirical finding in their ‘theory of sequential reciprocity'. This paper extends their analysis by moves of chance. More precisely, an extended framework is presented which allows for the analysis of strategic interactions of reciprocal agents in situations in which material outcomes also depend on chance. Moves of chance influence the attribution of responsibilities, people's perceptions about the (un)kindness of others and, hence, their reciprocal behavior. Furthermore, with the help of two applications it is demonstrated how this framework can be used to explain experimental findings showing that people react very differently in outcomewise-identical situations depending on the moves of chance involved.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - psychological games

KW - attribution theory

KW - procedural concerns

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.004

M3 - Journal article

VL - 68

SP - 339

EP - 352

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 14248668