Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy

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Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy. / Schultz, Christian.

Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.

Research output: Working paper › Research

Harvard

Schultz, C 1996 'Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy' Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

APA

Schultz, C. (1996). Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen.

Vancouver

Schultz C. Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen. 1996.

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy. Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1996.

Bibtex

@techreport{88e58aa0e91211dcbee902004c4f4f50,
title = "Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy",
abstract = "An infinitely repeated monetary policy game {\`a} la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game",
author = "Christian Schultz",
note = "JEL Classification: E52, D72",
year = "1996",
language = "English",
publisher = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",
address = "Denmark",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy

AU - Schultz, Christian

N1 - JEL Classification: E52, D72

PY - 1996

Y1 - 1996

N2 - An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game

AB - An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game

M3 - Working paper

BT - Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy

PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

ER -

ID: 2982418