Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Standard

Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence. / Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Markussen, Thomas; Meraglia, Simone.

2019.

Publikation: Working paper › Forskning

Harvard

Cobo-Reyes, R, Katz, G, Markussen, T & Meraglia, S 2019 'Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence'. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392859

APA

Cobo-Reyes, R., Katz, G., Markussen, T., & Meraglia, S. (2019). Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence. University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online) Nr. 19-07 https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392859

Vancouver

Cobo-Reyes R, Katz G, Markussen T, Meraglia S. Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence. 2019 jun. 10. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3392859

Author

Cobo-Reyes, Ramón ; Katz, Gabriel ; Markussen, Thomas ; Meraglia, Simone. / Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence. 2019. (University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online); Nr. 19-07).

Bibtex

@techreport{3c28f595f4f843da978bd300fb1021e7,
title = "Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence",
abstract = "We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open. ",
keywords = "Sanctions, Cooperation, Group Formation, Voting, Experiment, Sanctions, Cooperation, Group Formation, Voting, Experiment, C73, C91, C92, D72, H41",
author = "Ram{\'o}n Cobo-Reyes and Gabriel Katz and Thomas Markussen and Simone Meraglia",
year = "2019",
month = jun,
day = "10",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3392859",
language = "English",
series = "University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)",
number = "19-07",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence

AU - Cobo-Reyes, Ramón

AU - Katz, Gabriel

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Meraglia, Simone

PY - 2019/6/10

Y1 - 2019/6/10

N2 - We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.

AB - We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.

KW - Sanctions

KW - Cooperation

KW - Group Formation

KW - Voting

KW - Experiment

KW - Sanctions

KW - Cooperation

KW - Group Formation

KW - Voting

KW - Experiment

KW - C73

KW - C91

KW - C92

KW - D72

KW - H41

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3392859

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3392859

M3 - Working paper

T3 - University of Copenhagen. Institute of Economics. Discussion Papers (Online)

BT - Voting on Sanctioning Institutions in Open and Closed Communities: Experimental Evidence

ER -

ID: 248550464