Inequality, institutions and cooperation

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Standard

Inequality, institutions and cooperation. / Markussen, Thomas; Sharma, Smriti; Singhal, Saurabh; Tarp, Finn.

2020.

Publikation: Working paperForskning

Harvard

Markussen, T, Sharma, S, Singhal, S & Tarp, F 2020 'Inequality, institutions and cooperation'. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/lan/wpaper/309239622.html>

APA

Markussen, T., Sharma, S., Singhal, S., & Tarp, F. (2020). Inequality, institutions and cooperation. Economics Working Paper Series Bind 2020 Nr. 023UNU WIDER Working Paper Series Bind 2020 Nr. 127IZA Discussion Paper Bind 13812 Publications of the Development Economic Research Group (DERG) Nr. 03-2020 https://ideas.repec.org/p/lan/wpaper/309239622.html

Vancouver

Markussen T, Sharma S, Singhal S, Tarp F. Inequality, institutions and cooperation. 2020.

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Sharma, Smriti ; Singhal, Saurabh ; Tarp, Finn. / Inequality, institutions and cooperation. 2020. (Economics Working Paper Series; Nr. 023, Bind 2020). (UNU WIDER Working Paper Series; Nr. 127, Bind 2020). (IZA Discussion Paper, Bind 13812). (Publications of the Development Economic Research Group (DERG); Nr. 03-2020).

Bibtex

@techreport{ccdf596f85ef4f22add4b71602321f6f,
title = "Inequality, institutions and cooperation",
abstract = "We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We nd that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Smriti Sharma and Saurabh Singhal and Finn Tarp",
year = "2020",
language = "English",
series = "Economics Working Paper Series",
number = "023",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Inequality, institutions and cooperation

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Sharma, Smriti

AU - Singhal, Saurabh

AU - Tarp, Finn

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We nd that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

AB - We examine the effects of randomly introduced economic inequality on voluntary co-operation and whether this relationship is influenced by the quality of local institutions, as proxied by corruption. We use representative data from a large-scale lab-in-the-field public goods experiment with over 1,300 participants across rural Vietnam. Our results show that inequality adversely affects aggregate contributions, and this is on account of high endowment individuals contributing a significantly smaller share than those with low endowments. This negative effect of inequality on cooperation is exacerbated in high corruption environments. We nd that corruption leads to more pessimistic beliefs about others' contributions in heterogeneous groups, and this is an important mechanism explaining our results. In doing so, we highlight the indirect costs of corruption that are understudied in the literature. These findings have implications for public policies aimed at resolving local collective action problems.

M3 - Working paper

T3 - Economics Working Paper Series

BT - Inequality, institutions and cooperation

ER -

ID: 255740605