Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

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    Final published version, 293 KB, PDF document

  • Ola Andersson
  • Matteo Galizzi
  • Tim Hoppe
  • Sebastian Kranz
  • Karen van der Wiel
  • Erik Roland Wengström
 This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages8
Publication statusPublished - 2008

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