Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
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This paper investigates the number of profiles at which a social choice function is manipulable. It is found that there is a lower bound on this number when the social choice function is assumed non-dictatorial. Also, any number between this lower bound and the maximal number of profiles may be obtained as the number of manipulable profiles of some social choice function
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Pages (from-to) | 455-467 |
| ISSN | 0176-1714 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1998 |
ID: 155267