Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality. / Fosgerau, Mogens; Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jörgen.

In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2023, p. 201-242.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Fosgerau, M, Sethi, R & Weibull, J 2023, 'Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality', American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 201-242. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20210391

APA

Fosgerau, M., Sethi, R., & Weibull, J. (2023). Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 15(3), 201-242. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20210391

Vancouver

Fosgerau M, Sethi R, Weibull J. Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2023;15(3):201-242. https://doi.org/10.1257/MIC.20210391

Author

Fosgerau, Mogens ; Sethi, Rajiv ; Weibull, Jörgen. / Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 2023 ; Vol. 15, No. 3. pp. 201-242.

Bibtex

@article{897929dab0974d198bc9732183999363,
title = "Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality",
abstract = "We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effortto invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefullyto screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria,and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receivedifferent equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment by destabilizing the least active equilibrium.The endogeneity of screening enables powerful comparative statics,which we use to unify different strands in the literature on discrimination. ",
author = "Mogens Fosgerau and Rajiv Sethi and J{\"o}rgen Weibull",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1257/MIC.20210391",
language = "English",
volume = "15",
pages = "201--242",
journal = "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics",
issn = "1945-7669",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality

AU - Fosgerau, Mogens

AU - Sethi, Rajiv

AU - Weibull, Jörgen

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effortto invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefullyto screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria,and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receivedifferent equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment by destabilizing the least active equilibrium.The endogeneity of screening enables powerful comparative statics,which we use to unify different strands in the literature on discrimination.

AB - We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effortto invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefullyto screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria,and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receivedifferent equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment by destabilizing the least active equilibrium.The endogeneity of screening enables powerful comparative statics,which we use to unify different strands in the literature on discrimination.

U2 - 10.1257/MIC.20210391

DO - 10.1257/MIC.20210391

M3 - Journal article

VL - 15

SP - 201

EP - 242

JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

SN - 1945-7669

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 370037733