Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Standard
Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts. / Johannesen, Niels; Langetieg, Patrick ; Reck, Daniel; Risch, Max ; Slemrod, Joel .
In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2020, p. 312-346.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts
AU - Johannesen, Niels
AU - Langetieg, Patrick
AU - Reck, Daniel
AU - Risch, Max
AU - Slemrod, Joel
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
AB - In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers’ reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs, by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2-$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6-$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
U2 - 10.1257/pol.20180410
DO - 10.1257/pol.20180410
M3 - Journal article
VL - 12
SP - 312
EP - 346
JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
SN - 1945-7731
IS - 3
ER -
ID: 234022986