The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

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The dark side of the vote : Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting. / Morton, Rebecca B.; Piovesan, Marco; Tyran, Jean Robert.

In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 113, 01.2019, p. 461-481.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Morton, RB, Piovesan, M & Tyran, JR 2019, 'The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 113, pp. 461-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008

APA

Morton, R. B., Piovesan, M., & Tyran, J. R. (2019). The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting. Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 461-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008

Vancouver

Morton RB, Piovesan M, Tyran JR. The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting. Games and Economic Behavior. 2019 Jan;113:461-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008

Author

Morton, Rebecca B. ; Piovesan, Marco ; Tyran, Jean Robert. / The dark side of the vote : Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 2019 ; Vol. 113. pp. 461-481.

Bibtex

@article{d497f9113d7d443f85df98bad963d159,
title = "The dark side of the vote: Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting",
abstract = "We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.",
keywords = "Cognitive biases, Information aggregation, Social information, Voting, Wisdom of crowds",
author = "Morton, {Rebecca B.} and Marco Piovesan and Tyran, {Jean Robert}",
year = "2019",
month = jan,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008",
language = "English",
volume = "113",
pages = "461--481",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - The dark side of the vote

T2 - Biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting

AU - Morton, Rebecca B.

AU - Piovesan, Marco

AU - Tyran, Jean Robert

PY - 2019/1

Y1 - 2019/1

N2 - We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.

AB - We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a “dark side,” that is, result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. In line with theoretical predictions, information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. However, in the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective and does not sufficiently de-bias voters.

KW - Cognitive biases

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Social information

KW - Voting

KW - Wisdom of crowds

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85056570405&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2018.10.008

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85056570405

VL - 113

SP - 461

EP - 481

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

SN - 0899-8256

ER -

ID: 210060316