Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

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Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice. / Kartal, Melis; Tyran, Jean-Robert.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 112, No. 10, 10.2022, p. 3367-3397.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Kartal, M & Tyran, J-R 2022, 'Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice', American Economic Review, vol. 112, no. 10, pp. 3367-3397. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637866, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201844

APA

Kartal, M., & Tyran, J-R. (2022). Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice. American Economic Review, 112(10), 3367-3397. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637866, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201844

Vancouver

Kartal M, Tyran J-R. Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice. American Economic Review. 2022 Oct;112(10):3367-3397. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3637866, https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201844

Author

Kartal, Melis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert. / Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice. In: American Economic Review. 2022 ; Vol. 112, No. 10. pp. 3367-3397.

Bibtex

@article{09886c01434c4106870ff2bb44eb6255,
title = "Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice",
abstract = "This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We study extensions that allow for partisan biases, targeted misinformation intended to move public opinion in a specific direction, and correlated news signals (due to media ownership concentration or censure). In our experiment, voters are exposed to correct news or misinformation depending on their cognitive ability. Absent overconfidence, more cognitively able subjects are predicted to vote while less able subjects are predicted to abstain, and information is predicted to aggregate well. We provide evidence that overconfidence induces misinformed subjects to vote excessively, thereby severely undermining information aggregation.",
keywords = "Behavioral Political Economy, Voting, Misinformation, Dunning-Kruger Effect, behavioral political economy, voting, misinformation, Dunning-Krugereffect, D72, D83, D91",
author = "Melis Kartal and Jean-Robert Tyran",
year = "2022",
month = oct,
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3637866",
language = "English",
volume = "112",
pages = "3367--3397",
journal = "American Economic Review",
issn = "0002-8282",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "10",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice

AU - Kartal, Melis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert

PY - 2022/10

Y1 - 2022/10

N2 - This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We study extensions that allow for partisan biases, targeted misinformation intended to move public opinion in a specific direction, and correlated news signals (due to media ownership concentration or censure). In our experiment, voters are exposed to correct news or misinformation depending on their cognitive ability. Absent overconfidence, more cognitively able subjects are predicted to vote while less able subjects are predicted to abstain, and information is predicted to aggregate well. We provide evidence that overconfidence induces misinformed subjects to vote excessively, thereby severely undermining information aggregation.

AB - This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We study extensions that allow for partisan biases, targeted misinformation intended to move public opinion in a specific direction, and correlated news signals (due to media ownership concentration or censure). In our experiment, voters are exposed to correct news or misinformation depending on their cognitive ability. Absent overconfidence, more cognitively able subjects are predicted to vote while less able subjects are predicted to abstain, and information is predicted to aggregate well. We provide evidence that overconfidence induces misinformed subjects to vote excessively, thereby severely undermining information aggregation.

KW - Behavioral Political Economy

KW - Voting

KW - Misinformation

KW - Dunning-Kruger Effect

KW - behavioral political economy

KW - voting

KW - misinformation

KW - Dunning-Krugereffect

KW - D72

KW - D83

KW - D91

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3637866

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3637866

M3 - Journal article

VL - 112

SP - 3367

EP - 3397

JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

SN - 0002-8282

IS - 10

ER -

ID: 338788898