Labor Supply of Politicians
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
Using data on Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we examine the impact of salaries on the composition and the behavior of legislators. Employing a differences-in-differences approach, we exploit the introduction of a law that equalized MEPs’ salaries which had previously differed by as much as a factor of ten. Increasing salaries raises the fraction of MEPs who run for reelection but decreases the quality of elected MEPs (proxied by college quality). Salary has no discernible impact on effort or legislative output. Higher salaries induce more political competition.
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of the European Economic Association |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 5 |
Pages (from-to) | 871-905 |
ISSN | 1542-4766 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Oct 2015 |
Bibliographical note
Jel Classification: D72;D73
ID: 129709095