Strategic campaigns and redistributive politics

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articlepeer-review

The article investigates strategic, informative campaigning by two parties when politics concern redistribution. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favour special groups. Parties will target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium, campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile, most likely to vote, most receptive to campaigns and relatively uninformed initially. These groups will become more informed about policy. Parties will therefore gain more votes by treating these groups well so these groups will gain from strategic campaigning. Welfare effects are assessed
Original languageEnglish
JournalEconomic Journal
Volume117
Issue number522
Pages (from-to)936-963
ISSN0013-0133
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2007

ID: 1385605