Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments

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Promotions and Incentives : The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments. / Altmann, Steffen; Falk, Armin; Wibral, Matthias.

In: Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1, 01.01.2012, p. 149-174.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Altmann, S, Falk, A & Wibral, M 2012, 'Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments', Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 149-174. https://doi.org/10.1086/662130

APA

Altmann, S., Falk, A., & Wibral, M. (2012). Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics, 30(1), 149-174. https://doi.org/10.1086/662130

Vancouver

Altmann S, Falk A, Wibral M. Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics. 2012 Jan 1;30(1):149-174. https://doi.org/10.1086/662130

Author

Altmann, Steffen ; Falk, Armin ; Wibral, Matthias. / Promotions and Incentives : The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments. In: Journal of Labor Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 30, No. 1. pp. 149-174.

Bibtex

@article{dfc86a2db632434c8999bb25fa74590e,
title = "Promotions and Incentives: The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments",
abstract = "Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above-equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward-looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing.",
author = "Steffen Altmann and Armin Falk and Matthias Wibral",
year = "2012",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1086/662130",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "149--174",
journal = "Journal of Labor Economics",
issn = "0734-306X",
publisher = "University of Chicago Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Promotions and Incentives

T2 - The Case of Multistage Elimination Tournaments

AU - Altmann, Steffen

AU - Falk, Armin

AU - Wibral, Matthias

PY - 2012/1/1

Y1 - 2012/1/1

N2 - Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above-equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward-looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing.

AB - Promotions play an important role for the provision of incentives in firms. We analyze incentives in multistage elimination tournaments with controlled laboratory experiments. In our two main treatments, we compare a two-stage tournament to a one-stage tournament. Subjects in the two-stage treatment provide excess effort in the first stage, both with respect to Nash predictions and compared to the strategically equivalent one-stage tournament. Additional control treatments confirm that excess effort in early stages is a robust finding and suggest that above-equilibrium effort might be driven by limited degrees of forward-looking behavior and subjects deriving nonmonetary value from competing.

U2 - 10.1086/662130

DO - 10.1086/662130

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:84856006160

VL - 30

SP - 149

EP - 174

JO - Journal of Labor Economics

JF - Journal of Labor Economics

SN - 0734-306X

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 126372412