Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides. / Schultz, Christian.

In: Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 50, No. 3, 05.2017, p. 287-301.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Schultz, C 2017, 'Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides', Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 287-301. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

APA

Schultz, C. (2017). Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides. Review of Industrial Organization, 50(3), 287-301. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

Vancouver

Schultz C. Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides. Review of Industrial Organization. 2017 May;50(3):287-301. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

Author

Schultz, Christian. / Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides. In: Review of Industrial Organization. 2017 ; Vol. 50, No. 3. pp. 287-301.

Bibtex

@article{96ba85b418044aaf87050a96762e43e2,
title = "Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides",
abstract = "The paper considers tacit collusion in markets that are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which firm to purchase from, and each firm only detects the other firm{\textquoteright}s price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more difficult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor that affects transparency positively on both sides are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this holds when firms are easier to inform than are consumers.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Transparency, Tacit collusion, Cartel theory, Competition policy, Internet, L13, L40",
author = "Christian Schultz",
year = "2017",
month = may,
doi = "10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7",
language = "English",
volume = "50",
pages = "287--301",
journal = "Review of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0889-938X",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "3",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Collusion in Markets with Imperfect Price Information on Both Sides

AU - Schultz, Christian

PY - 2017/5

Y1 - 2017/5

N2 - The paper considers tacit collusion in markets that are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which firm to purchase from, and each firm only detects the other firm’s price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more difficult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor that affects transparency positively on both sides are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this holds when firms are easier to inform than are consumers.

AB - The paper considers tacit collusion in markets that are not fully transparent on both sides. Consumers only detect prices with some probability before deciding which firm to purchase from, and each firm only detects the other firm’s price with some probability. Increasing transparency on the producer side facilitates collusion, while increasing transparency on the consumer side makes collusion more difficult. Conditions are given under which increases in a common factor that affects transparency positively on both sides are pro-competitive. With two standard information technologies, this holds when firms are easier to inform than are consumers.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Transparency

KW - Tacit collusion

KW - Cartel theory

KW - Competition policy

KW - Internet

KW - L13

KW - L40

U2 - 10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

DO - 10.1007/s11151-016-9539-7

M3 - Journal article

VL - 50

SP - 287

EP - 301

JO - Review of Industrial Organization

JF - Review of Industrial Organization

SN - 0889-938X

IS - 3

ER -

ID: 178696704