Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention

Research output: Working paperResearch

Standard

Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention. / Fosgerau, Mogens; Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jorgen W.

2020.

Research output: Working paperResearch

Harvard

Fosgerau, M, Sethi, R & Weibull, JW 2020 'Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention'. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533952

APA

Fosgerau, M., Sethi, R., & Weibull, J. W. (2020). Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533952

Vancouver

Fosgerau M, Sethi R, Weibull JW. Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention. 2020 Mar 5. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3533952

Author

Fosgerau, Mogens ; Sethi, Rajiv ; Weibull, Jorgen W. / Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention. 2020.

Bibtex

@techreport{708e8c75bb894c05ae6f209933ee9861,
title = "Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention",
abstract = "A rationally inattentive screener evaluates a heterogeneous pool of candidates, aiming to let only high-productivity candidates pass. Candidates belong to distinct and observable social categories. There is heterogenity across categories along multiple dimensions, including the costs of investment in skills, the costs of being screened, and the degree of bias faced in the screening process. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill development before being screened, with a payoff in a post-screening market that depends on the screening outcome. We characterize equilibrium behavior in this model, and use it to unify and extend several strands in the literature on categorical inequality, including statistical discrimination, prejudice, and social capital.",
author = "Mogens Fosgerau and Rajiv Sethi and Weibull, {Jorgen W.}",
year = "2020",
month = mar,
day = "5",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3533952",
language = "Dansk",
type = "WorkingPaper",

}

RIS

TY - UNPB

T1 - Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention

AU - Fosgerau, Mogens

AU - Sethi, Rajiv

AU - Weibull, Jorgen W.

PY - 2020/3/5

Y1 - 2020/3/5

N2 - A rationally inattentive screener evaluates a heterogeneous pool of candidates, aiming to let only high-productivity candidates pass. Candidates belong to distinct and observable social categories. There is heterogenity across categories along multiple dimensions, including the costs of investment in skills, the costs of being screened, and the degree of bias faced in the screening process. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill development before being screened, with a payoff in a post-screening market that depends on the screening outcome. We characterize equilibrium behavior in this model, and use it to unify and extend several strands in the literature on categorical inequality, including statistical discrimination, prejudice, and social capital.

AB - A rationally inattentive screener evaluates a heterogeneous pool of candidates, aiming to let only high-productivity candidates pass. Candidates belong to distinct and observable social categories. There is heterogenity across categories along multiple dimensions, including the costs of investment in skills, the costs of being screened, and the degree of bias faced in the screening process. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill development before being screened, with a payoff in a post-screening market that depends on the screening outcome. We characterize equilibrium behavior in this model, and use it to unify and extend several strands in the literature on categorical inequality, including statistical discrimination, prejudice, and social capital.

UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/9561a0d5-63d3-3a7a-9d8e-7324ea637dd5/

U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3533952

DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3533952

M3 - Working paper

BT - Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention

ER -

ID: 249588315