Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

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Standard

Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes. / Markussen, Thomas; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

I: Review of Economic Studies, Bind 81, Nr. 1, 2014, s. 301-324.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Markussen, T, Putterman, L & Tyran, J-RK 2014, 'Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes', Review of Economic Studies, bind 81, nr. 1, s. 301-324. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt022

APA

Markussen, T., Putterman, L., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2014). Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes. Review of Economic Studies, 81(1), 301-324. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt022

Vancouver

Markussen T, Putterman L, Tyran J-RK. Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes. Review of Economic Studies. 2014;81(1):301-324. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt022

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Putterman, Louis ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / Self-Organization for Collective Action : An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes. I: Review of Economic Studies. 2014 ; Bind 81, Nr. 1. s. 301-324.

Bibtex

@article{0ed1ee421178491f828262c5c8277381,
title = "Self-Organization for Collective Action: An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes",
abstract = "Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, informal sanctions surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design. ",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Formal sanctions, Informal sanctions, Experiment, Voting, Cooperation, Punishment",
author = "Thomas Markussen and Louis Putterman and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
note = "JEL Classification: C92; C91; D03; D71; H41",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1093/restud/rdt022",
language = "English",
volume = "81",
pages = "301--324",
journal = "Review of Economic Studies",
issn = "0034-6527",
publisher = "Oxford University Press",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Self-Organization for Collective Action

T2 - An Experimental Study of Voting on Sanction Regimes

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Putterman, Louis

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

N1 - JEL Classification: C92; C91; D03; D71; H41

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, informal sanctions surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.

AB - Entrusting the power to punish to a central authority is a hallmark of civilization, yet informal or horizontal sanctions have attracted more attention of late. We study experimentally a collective action dilemma and test whether subjects choose a formal sanction scheme that costs less than the surplus it makes possible, as predicted by standard economic theory, or instead opt for the use of informal sanctions or no sanctions. Our subjects choose, and succeed in using, informal sanctions surprisingly often, their voting decisions being responsive to the cost of formal sanctions. Adoption by voting enhances the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. Results are qualitatively confirmed under several permutations of the experimental design.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Formal sanctions

KW - Informal sanctions

KW - Experiment

KW - Voting

KW - Cooperation

KW - Punishment

U2 - 10.1093/restud/rdt022

DO - 10.1093/restud/rdt022

M3 - Journal article

VL - 81

SP - 301

EP - 324

JO - Review of Economic Studies

JF - Review of Economic Studies

SN - 0034-6527

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 82120154