Preferences and beliefs in intergroup conflict

Publikation: AndetAndet bidragForskning

To solve the puzzle of individual participation in intergroup conflict, theoretical
accounts rooted in various disciplines suggest that individuals’ interconnected social preferences for the welfare of in-group and out-group members predict their conflict engagement. Yet, research also suggests that individuals may reciprocate anticipated and actual harmful behaviour from out-group members or beneficial behaviour from in-group members. We combined these different approaches and tested the relative importance of preferences and beliefs in predicting conflict participation. To this end, we elicited both preferences towards in-group and out-group members and beliefs about
in-group and out-group members’ behaviours prior to playing an incentivised intergroup conflict game with natural groups (N = 973). In this game, individuals could engage in costly behaviour to either benefit their in-group (without consequences to the out-group) or to both benefit their in-group and harm the out-group. Both preferences and beliefs contributed to explaining in-group beneficial and out-group harming behaviour. Importantly, however, beliefs were more strongly associated with behaviour than group-based preferences. Moreover, we found that negative reciprocity towards
out-group members was stronger when the out-group was expected to actually harm the in-group rather than to merely harbour ill intentions. Taken together, the findings suggest that participation in intergroup conflict is better explained by positive and negative reciprocity than purely by group-based preferences.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Publikationsdato18 aug. 2021
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 18 aug. 2021

ID: 290030873