Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Standard

Competition, cooperation, and collective choice. / Markussen, Thomas; Reuben Paris, Ernesto Guillermo; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl.

I: Economic Journal, Bind 124, Nr. 574, 2014, s. F163-F195.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskriftTidsskriftartikelfagfællebedømt

Harvard

Markussen, T, Reuben Paris, EG & Tyran, J-RK 2014, 'Competition, cooperation, and collective choice', Economic Journal, bind 124, nr. 574, s. F163-F195. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12096

APA

Markussen, T., Reuben Paris, E. G., & Tyran, J-R. K. (2014). Competition, cooperation, and collective choice. Economic Journal, 124(574), F163-F195. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12096

Vancouver

Markussen T, Reuben Paris EG, Tyran J-RK. Competition, cooperation, and collective choice. Economic Journal. 2014;124(574):F163-F195. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12096

Author

Markussen, Thomas ; Reuben Paris, Ernesto Guillermo ; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl. / Competition, cooperation, and collective choice. I: Economic Journal. 2014 ; Bind 124, Nr. 574. s. F163-F195.

Bibtex

@article{67777e7591ab429bb3d9c65c046fc5a6,
title = "Competition, cooperation, and collective choice",
abstract = "The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone",
author = "Thomas Markussen and {Reuben Paris}, {Ernesto Guillermo} and Tyran, {Jean-Robert Karl}",
year = "2014",
doi = "10.1111/ecoj.12096",
language = "English",
volume = "124",
pages = "F163--F195",
journal = "The Economic Journal",
issn = "0013-0133",
publisher = "Wiley",
number = "574",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition, cooperation, and collective choice

AU - Markussen, Thomas

AU - Reuben Paris, Ernesto Guillermo

AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl

PY - 2014

Y1 - 2014

N2 - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone

AB - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition, which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular, but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone

U2 - 10.1111/ecoj.12096

DO - 10.1111/ecoj.12096

M3 - Journal article

VL - 124

SP - F163-F195

JO - The Economic Journal

JF - The Economic Journal

SN - 0013-0133

IS - 574

ER -

ID: 82129010